Disconnections in US and EU Agricultural Policy and Trade Negotiations: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach by Young, Linda M. & Hansen, Kathleen C.
Volume 12 Number 1 2011/p. 12-28  esteyjournal.com 
 
 
Editorial Office: 410 22
nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. _____ 




Disconnections in US and EU Agricultural 
Policy and Trade Negotiations:  
A Transaction Cost Politics Approach 
Linda M. Young  
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Montana State University 
Kathleen C. Hansen 
Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Montana State University 
Acknowledgements: While the authors take full responsibility for all errors of fact and 
interpretation, they want to acknowledge helpful discussion with and comments from 
Timothy Josling, Carol Goodloe and Joseph Glauber. 
This article investigates aspects of the institutions and decision making processes in 
the United States and the European Union that affect the coordination of domestic farm 
programs and trade negotiations for agriculture in each entity. We explore how current 
institutions and processes contribute to a level of incoherence – or lack of coordination 
– between domestic farm programs and trade negotiations in the United States. 
Constructs from transaction cost politics with an emphasis on the decision to delegate 
authority from the principal to an agent are used to understand how institutional 
processes affect the coordination of domestic legislation. 
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Introduction 
his article uses transaction cost politics (TCP) to investigate aspects of the 
institutions and decision making processes that affect the coordination of 
agricultural policy as expressed in domestic legislation and WTO commitments for 
the United States and the European Union. Agricultural policy is implemented by 
legislation, in the United States in national legislation commonly called the farm bill 
and in the European Union in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). At the same 
time, both entities have undertaken commitments as signatories of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade Organization. These 
commitments constrain the nature of policies used and the extent of subsidization. 
Negotiations in the Doha Round of the WTO could result in further constraints on 
agricultural policy. 
We use the term policy disconnection to describe a lack of coherence between 
domestic agricultural legislation and current and potential agreements on agricultural 
policy through the WTO. In contrast, policy coherence is characterized by a common 
medium- and long-term vision for agricultural policy as implemented in both domestic 
legislation and through international trade commitments. We argue that a greater 
degree of policy disconnection exists in the United States than in the EU. This 
disconnection is evident in the passage of farm bills that include policies that do NOT 
reduce subsidies or conform with the push for “decoupled” policies for domestic 
support laboriously negotiated in the URAA and in the current negotiations under the 
Doha Round. It is also evident in the reluctance expressed by Congress to modify U.S. 
farm programs to bring them into compliance with WTO rulings from its dispute 
resolution process, most notably on U.S. cotton programs. Finally, U.S. trade 
negotiators have spent time and effort to achieve specific provisions that have 
subsequently been made irrelevant by changes to the farm bill enacted by the U.S. 
Congress. 
The disconnection between the farm bill and the WTO agreements and 
negotiations for agriculture can be explained by Congressional decisions to delegate 
significant authority to the Office of the U. S. Trade Representative (USTR) to 
negotiate trade agreements while guarding its own decision making authority over 
farm policy. The disconnection, illustrated by the following examples, became evident 
at the beginning of negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the first time that domestic 
policies for agriculture had been included in a significant manner in negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
In 1987 the Reagan administration proposed that commodity-specific programs 
for price and income support be reduced to zero by all nations, a proposal that 
TLinda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   14 
 
Cochrane argues Congress would never accept (Cochrane, 1990). Critics of the 
subsidization of U.S. agriculture and the resulting economic inefficiencies have hoped 
that U.S. commitments in the URAA and the promise of further trade reform would 
motivate the U.S. Congress to reduce the level of domestic subsidies and to use 
different instruments to provide income support; but even after the URAA, Congress 
and trade negotiators appear to have diverged. Runge (2006, 5) notes that the 2002 
farm bill “set a course for domestic agricultural and trade policy at direct variance 
with US commitments in the previous round” and that “As the expiration and 
reauthorization date for this legislation loomed, it stood in starker and starker contrast 
to the purported negotiating goals in Geneva” (Runge 2006, 5). He further notes that 
“Meanwhile, U.S. negotiators in Geneva pretended not to care about the egregious 
2002 Farm Bill, and in 2004 advanced what only can be described as Pollyannish farm 
trade proposals offering liberalization in return for major concessions from the EU, 
Japan and developing countries granting U.S. access to their markets” (Runge 2006, 
9). Orden, Blandford and Josling (2009, 8) discuss how the Secretary of Agriculture 
approached the 2007 farm bill with the objective of making it “beyond challenge” by 
the WTO, but “Despite these arguments, the historical record demonstrates very little 
preemptive movement of U.S. policy to be consistent with WTO disciplines,” and 
they note that Congress has little appetite to realign U.S. policies to minimize conflict 
with the WTO. Bertini, Schumacher and Thompson (2006) argue that the position of 
the U.S. Congress on domestic agricultural policy was a major factor in the collapse 
of negotiations in the Doha Round. 
One reason for the lack of coherence between farm policy and trade negotiations 
and commitments is that Congress does not have a long-term vision for domestic 
agricultural policy (Josling, 2009; Bertini, Schumacher and Thompson, 2006). The 
lack of a vision to discipline and coordinate U.S. domestic policy and its stance in 
trade negotiations and implementation is costly to the United States. Trade 
negotiations operate on a “tit for tat” basis in which countries make promises to 
change their policies in exchange for changes in their partners’ policies, a system that 
requires countries to make credible commitments. However, U.S. proposals for trade 
reform involving domestic agricultural policy are treated with skepticism (Whalley 
and Hamilton, 1996; Blustein, 2009). For example, passage of the 2002 farm bill 
resulted in the deterioration of U.S. leadership and effectiveness in the Doha Round 
negotiations due to serious doubts expressed about U.S. resolve to implement reforms 
(Blustein, 2009). More specifically, it has resulted in U.S. trade officials negotiating 
for specific provisions that Congress has made subsequently irrelevant, a costly waste 
of negotiating capital. A case study of the negotiations for the blue box in the Uruguay Linda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
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Round and for a “revised” blue box in the Doha Round is used to illustrate the 
problem of disconnection and its costs. The case study of reform of the CAP, 
intertwined with the Uruguay Round negotiations, provides an example of a tighter 
connection between domestic policy and trade policy. Differences between the two 
policy processes are instructive. Both the United States and the EU state that they 
remain committed to further agricultural trade liberalization through the WTO and 
regional trade agreements, suggesting that the coherence of domestic and trade policy 
for agriculture will remain an important issue. 
This research applies transaction cost economics and its offshoot, transaction cost 
politics, to analyze the policy process for coordinating domestic and trade policy for 
agriculture. We use theory, historical accounts, a review of the literature and 
interviews in our analysis of the disconnection between domestic agricultural policy 
legislation and agreements in the WTO. The case studies are based on interviews with 
academics and government officials involved in the negotiation of the Uruguay and 
the Doha rounds of trade negotiations. 
We hypothesize that a significant contribution to the disconnection evident in U.S. 
policy is due to the delegation of trade negotiations to the Executive Branch, while 
Congress has closely guarded its own authority over the writing and passage of farm 
bills. In fact, Congress delegated authority for trade negotiations before the details for 
domestic agricultural policy became a significant part of them, and since then 
Congress has made only marginal institutional adjustments to account for its 
inclusion. In the EU, agricultural policy and trade negotiations are coordinated due to 
the key role that the same institutions, the European Commission and the European 
Council, play in both areas of policy. The case study on the EU also demonstrates how 
the two areas have been effectively intertwined. 
Transaction Cost Politics 
ransaction costs are the forces that cause outcomes to diverge from Coasian or 
optimal outcomes due to time inconsistencies, the nature of the principal-agent 
relations and the costs of making, monitoring and enforcing agreements. Dixit (1996) 
notes that transaction costs are even more pronounced in politics than in other 
economic relationships, and transaction cost politics has evolved using key concepts 
of transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain political outcomes. 
We use constructs from TCP at the level of the individual decision maker to 
explain the conditions under which principals delegate decision making to agents. At 
the institutional level, TCP compares how institutional organization impacts political 
outcomes and policy decisions. An underlying hypothesis is that institutions evolve to 
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minimize overall transaction costs so that adaptation rather than costly change is the 
norm (Dixit, 1996). As institutions seek to minimize overall transaction costs they 
may accommodate some amount of dysfunction in particular components of the 
institution. In this case we hypothesize that the U.S. Congress tolerates the level of 
dysfunction that results from the disconnection between domestic and trade policy 
concerned with agriculture because the costs of changing the institutional structure are 
even higher. 
The Delegation of Trade Policy in the United States and 
the European Union 
or the EU, one important explanation of the delegation of trade policy is quite 
simple: a common market requires a common trade policy. However, for both 
entities decision makers have delegated trade policy due to the difficulty of pleasing a 
broad range of constituents with trade policy decisions. The constituency of legislators 
and decision makers is likely to include a mix of exporting and importing-competing 
industries. Both import protection and export promotion policies tend to provide 
concentrated costs and benefits to a few while a liberal trade regime provides diffuse 
benefits to the many, posing a difficult challenge to decision makers. 
Destler (1986) argues that the U.S. Congress protected itself from the 
ramifications of making trade policy by delegating it to an agent, namely the 
Executive Branch. In this way Congress could give broad mandates for trade policy, 
particularly for exports, to its agent and deflect requests from constituents. Epstein 
and O’Halloran (1999) enrich this argument by developing the TCP theory behind the 
decision to delegate. They propose that legislators are motivated to maximize their 
probability of re-election and calculate if they should undertake a particular policy 
decision or delegate it to the Executive Branch in terms of how it impacts their 
chances for re-election. This decision is similar to the decision of the firm when it 
evaluates whether to produce or buy inputs, a decision made according to a cost-
benefit analysis of the respective costs of these two options. If the cost to individual 
legislators of making policy is larger than the electoral benefits, then Congress as a 
whole is likely to delegate some degree of decision making authority to the Executive 
Branch (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). As we discuss later, Congress has never 
delegated authority for farm bills due to the positive role the farm bill plays in creating 
support for Congressional re-election. In contrast, the impact of trade liberalization on 
Congressional chances for re-election is much less clear. Multilateral trade 
liberalization creates a diverse array of winners and losers, and both may exist in one 
Congressional district. The outcomes for export and import-competing firms may vary 
from expectations due to unanticipated changes in world prices or unexpected 
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competition. Additionally, trade negotiations are complex and are likely to require 
several years to reach completion, and both the substance and probability of an 
agreement are uncertain. For a legislator it is problematic to devote considerable time 
to an issue that may not yield any benefits by increasing the probability of re-election. 
Congress has always had the authority to regulate commerce, including 
international trade. Destler (1986) argues that Congress recognizes its dysfunctionality 
on trade policy and so has consistently increased the authority given the Executive 
Branch to negotiate and implement trade agreements on an ever broader range of 
goods and services. Recognizing the consequences of the Smoot Hawley tariffs and its 
vulnerability to protectionist trade policy, in 1934 Congress gave the power to reduce 
tariffs by 50 percent to the Executive Branch. In 1962 Congress created the Office of 
the Special Trade Representative and gave it the chief responsibility for negotiations 
in the Kennedy Round of the GATT. In 1974 the office was elevated to a cabinet 
position and made accountable directly to both the president and Congress. In 1979 
the STR was renamed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and was given 
the lead role in the development and coordination of policy for trade and trade-related 



































Figure 1  U.S. trade and agricultural policy process. Linda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
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The USTR provides an example of the delegation of authority accompanied by the 
creation of a new agency to perform the delegated task (Dixit, 1996). TCP emphasizes 
that new agencies are likely to have a clear mission and to be staffed with people who 
strongly concur with the mission. The agency in turn is likely to generate information 
and analysis that reinforces belief in the mission of the agency, giving rise to an 
organizational culture and accentuating a bias towards self-perpetuation. Dryden’s 
(1995) historical account of the STR and USTR provides evidence of the agencies’ 
strong belief in the desirability of a liberal trade regime and their efforts to achieve it. 
Their advocacy for free trade is stronger and more unequivocal than that of Congress, 
particularly since the 1970s (Destler, 1986), when Congressional support for free trade 
lessened and started to divide along party lines. Delegation of authority is 
accompanied by the implementation of control mechanisms by the principal over the 
agent. When Congress increased the scope of the USTR’s mandate to include services 
and intellectual property, Congress also implemented trade promotion authority, 
requiring an up or down vote by Congress to implement the agreements negotiated by 
the USTR. 
The politics and processes of trade policy in the EU differ substantially from those 
of the United States. Trade policy has been an area of authority (named competence) 
for the EU since the Treaty of Rome in 1958. Member states delegated trade authority 
to the EU in order to insulate decision making about trade policy from protectionist 
and national re-election pressures (Meunier, 2005). Figure 2 illustrates both the trade 
and the agricultural policy processes for the EU. For both, proposals originate with the 
European Commission, which then takes them to the European Council with the 
catch-all description that the “the Commission proposes and the Council disposes.” 
For agricultural policy the members of the Article 133 Committee, made up of senior 
trade officials from each state, maintain a dialogue with the Commission on these 
proposals. The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), a body of 
member states’ permanent representatives in Brussels, does detailed work in preparing 
the Council for discussion. The Lisbon Treaty has increased the role of the European 
Parliament (EP), and it provides input to the Council. An iterative process between the 
EP and the Council exists for resolving differences. However, to date the central 
actors in trade policy have been the Commission and the Council. 
The structure of decision making in the EU has made political trades between 
interest groups and legislators much less prominent than in the Unites States (Dür and 
Zimmerman, 2007). “EU trade policy can be relatively technocratic, compared for 
example to that of the US, with close interplay between the Commission and the 
national offices in the Article 133 Committee shaping much of the substance of Linda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
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policy” (Woolcock 2005, 2). In fact, Woolcock argues that in the past national 
governments (outside of the Article 133 Committee) had little role in scrutinizing 




















The United States and the EU: Delegation of 
Agricultural Policy 
CP shares with theories of rent-seeking the hypothesis that elected officials will 
vote according to their self-interest, defined as maximizing their chances of re-
election. Legislators vote for legislation favouring specific groups in return for both 
monetary support and votes for their re-election. While Congress has been responsible 
for domestic farm policy throughout its history, the passage of the 1933 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act was a significant policy act. Support for the farm bill spans both 
parties (Orden and Blandford, 2008), and the farm bill has momentum that has 
withstood substantial challenges from changes in the sector, including the 
internationalization of agriculture, concerns over equity with other sectors and 
budgetary concerns. The United States insisted on special treatment for agriculture in 
the GATT so that Congress could implement domestic agricultural policy, particularly 
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predictably, with around ten years between bills in the 1950s to 1970s and on a 
consistent five- or six-year cycle since then. 
Many authors have examined how the farm bills have created momentum through 
interests vested in the continuation of the policy. Bonnen (1997) describes how the 
Congressional agricultural committee structure evolved to include a large number of 
subcommittees in the 1950s and 1960s to account for the needs of the sector and, by 
doing so, created new vested interests. Browne (1988) and Orden, Paarlberg and Roe 
(1999) describe in some detail how commodity groups became permanent and 
influential components of the policy process for farm bills. Many analyses of the U.S. 
farm bill recognize how the diversity of interests represented in the bill has been 
critical to continued Congressional support (Browne, 1988; Orden, Paarlberg and Roe, 
1999). Recently, Orden, Blandford and Josling (2009) conclude that domestic 
subsidies for agricultural producers are likely to remain unchanged unless dramatic 
changes occur in this coalition. 
Rent-seeking provides a well used and widely accepted explanation for legislative 
support of farm programs. TCE and TCP deepen the analytical framework by 
addressing the issues of the value and time consistency of the political exchange 
between interest groups and legislators. North (1990) argues that it is difficult to 
measure the value of an exchange between legislators and special interest groups. 
Time consistency is a problem, as neither group can be certain that the other party will 
fulfill their part of the bargain and no institutions exist to enforce these political 
contracts (Dixit, 1996; North, 1990). Additionally, unforeseen economic 
developments on the domestic or international level can change the value of 
legislation favouring particular groups. All of these factors contribute to the difficulty 
of making credible commitments in political markets. 
The contract is a mechanism for making credible commitments, and in theory 
perfect contracts specify outcomes for all possible contingencies. We argue that the 
longevity, predictability and precision of the farm bill provide elements of a contract 
between farm bill constituents and legislators and hence increase the ability of 
legislators to make credible commitments. Farm bills usually contain a well defined 
set of programs. The parameters that determine payments are specified, and frequently 
contingencies are detailed to account for changes in world prices. The introduction of 
new programs is usually conducted with substantial input from the agricultural 
interests involved. These characteristics give the farm bill some features of a contract, 
although it is admittedly an incomplete contract as not all eventualities are specified. 
It is more difficult to address the concern that legislators vote to support the 
agricultural sector without assurance of continued support from the beneficiaries; Linda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
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however, ample literature supports the claim that both sides meet the terms of this 
implicit contract. 
Due to the returns from political markets concerned with agricultural policy, 
Congress has fiercely guarded its power in this arena. As discussed earlier, in 2002 
Congress passed a farm bill incongruent with the U.S. negotiating stance in Geneva. 
In 2007 the administration presented a farm bill to Congress with key measures to 
achieve WTO compliance, including reducing cotton loan rates, allowing fruits and 
vegetables to be grown on base acres and changing the basis of counter-cyclical 
payments (Orden, Blandford and Josling, 2009). Congress rejected the 
administration’s proposal and in July of 2008 passed a bill with enough votes to be 
enacted despite a presidential veto. 
As illustrated on a micro level with this case study, a degree of incoherence 
between the mechanics and direction of domestic agricultural policy as expressed in 
the farm bill and in WTO agreements is the result of the history of the delegation of 
trade policy and the much later inclusion of the details of domestic farm policy in 
multilateral negotiations, with only marginal institutional adjustments to 
accommodate the change. The URAA resulted in numerous commitments by the 
United States to constrain its agricultural policy and to recommence negotiations in 
1999. Recognizing the continuing importance of agriculture in future negotiations, the 
2000 Trade and Development Act created the position of Chief Agricultural 
Negotiator within the USTR to conduct trade negotiations and enforce agreements of 
concern to U.S. agriculture. To increase coordination between the two bodies, the 
USTR briefs Congress on the progress and content of trade negotiations. However, the 
effectiveness of these efforts in creating agreement on policy directions has varied 
depending on the issue and the leadership of the USTR (Blustein, 2009). In 2002 the 
farm bill included a clause authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to make 
adjustments to program parameters of the farm bill if necessary to maintain 
compliance with U.S. commitments under the WTO. These are all examples of 
marginal adjustments within an existing institution to minimize the cost of adapting to 
a new challenge, namely, the emergence of agriculture as an important issue in trade 
negotiations. 
The EU has not received significant criticism in recent years of the nature directed 
at the United States for a lack of connection between the CAP and EU obligations 
under the WTO. Agriculture in the EU has been subsidized for a long period of time 
and the EU has received substantial criticism for its high, although steadily declining, 
subsidization of the sector. Linda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
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In the EU the same institutions are involved in both domestic and international 
agricultural and trade policy development and negotiations. The European 
Commission proposes changes to agricultural policy to the European Council (see 
figure 2). When the EC discusses agricultural issues the agricultural representative of 
each state attends and the council is referred to as the Agricultural Council. The 
Special Committee on Agriculture consists of experts from each national ministry of 
agriculture and the EC Directorate General on Agriculture, and it undertakes 
preparatory work for the Council’s decisions. The Council is responsible for making 
decisions on agricultural policy. However, with the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty the Council must now consult with the European Parliament about changes to 
agricultural policy. 
The institutional arrangements for policy decisions discussed above, and 
represented in figure 1 for the United States and figure 2 for the European Union, are 
illustrated in the case studies below. 
The Blue Box: A Case Study of U.S. Policy 
Disconnection 
his case study of the negotiation of the blue box, a component of the Domestic 
Support Pillar of the URAA, illustrates the nature of the disconnection between 
trade negotiations and farm bills. When the Uruguay Round negotiations came to an 
impasse in 1992, the United States and the EU met separately and negotiated the Blair 
House accords. Both the United States and the EU wanted to negotiate further 
provisions that would allow the continuation of current agricultural programs, as 
neither wanted to be forced to implement politically difficult cutbacks in agricultural 
subsidies.  
A key element of the accords was the creation of the blue box, a new category of 
payments to producers that were accompanied by supply control measures. Inclusion 
of the blue box into the URAA would allow both the United States and the EU to 
subsidize producers beyond the limit negotiated for the production-distorting policies 
included in the amber box. However, one year later, after the implementation of the 
URAA, the U.S. Congress passed the 1996 farm bill and eliminated deficiency 
payments. This essentially made the blue box irrelevant for the United States 
(Glauber, 2010; Goodloe, 2009; Josling, 2009), and the United States did not report 
blue box expenditures after 1995. 
In 2002 the Congress enacted a farm bill that introduced a new policy of counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs). At this point in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations the 
United States faced pressure to reduce its domestic support categorized as amber box. 
In response, U.S. agricultural trade negotiators proposed a revised blue box that would 
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include counter-cyclical payments. Negotiations over the revised blue box cost the 
United States some negotiating capital in terms of market access provisions with the 
EU. Shortly afterwards the U.S. Congress passed the 2008 farm bill and introduced a 
new optional program of whole farm insurance named the ACRE program. Farmers 
must choose whether to participate in ACRE or in traditional commodity programs. As 
ACRE is clearly a policy that fits within the amber box and was anticipated to be a 
“good deal” for most farmers, it was consequently anticipated that amber box 
expenditures and thus the U.S. aggregate measure of support would increase despite 
international pressure on the United States to decrease amber box support (Goodloe, 
2009). These developments cast doubt on the usefulness of the negotiated “new blue 
box.” So, U.S. trade officials have twice used valuable time and capital to negotiate 
provisions they believed would assist U.S. agricultural interests (Glauber, 2010; 
Goodloe, 2009), and in both cases their successful efforts on the blue box have been 
made irrelevant by subsequent policy decisions of the U.S. Congress. 
Transaction cost politics stresses the difficulty of making credible commitments in 
political markets (North, 1990; Dixit, 1996; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). The U.S. 
Congress makes credible commitments to agricultural interests in the United States as 
implemented through the farm bill, although some changes in direction have taken 
place. The problem arises when negotiations under the WTO directly conflict with 
Congressional interests in the farm bill. Trade policy was delegated for a long period 
of time before domestic agricultural policy became a significant part of the 
negotiations, and Congress continues to guard its own authority over farm legislation. 
These conflicts have resulted in an overall loss of credibility for the United States as it 
negotiates for increased constraints on domestic agricultural policies as a part of trade 
negotiations. It also means that at times the United States has spent scarce capital 
negotiating for provisions that it subsequently hasn’t used. The marginal institutional 
adjustments that have been made to coordinate the farm policy and trade negotiations 
for agriculture are insufficient to provide substantial coordination between Congress 
and the USTR. More significant changes would need to be enacted by Congress; 
however, as the USTR bears the brunt of the costs of this disconnection in terms of 
reduced credibility and negotiating capital, Congress has insufficient motivation to 
bear the cost of change. Congress likely would not have authorized inclusion of 
agriculture in the negotiations if this required an accompanying reduction in 
Congressional authority over U.S. farm programs. TCP argues that a broad view must 
be taken to appreciate how an institution will evolve to minimize its overall 
transaction costs. More substantial institutional changes could be made to ensure the 
coordination of agricultural policy and trade negotiations; however, the costs of Linda M. Young and Kathleen C. Hansen 
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institutional change appear to overwhelm the costs of the current level of policy 
disconnection. 
EU Case Study: CAP Reform and the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations 
he case study on the EU illustrates a much tighter connection between their 
domestic policy and their strategy for trade negotiations. In 1986 the EC 
embarked upon the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations with promises to domestic 
constituents that mechanisms of the CAP would not be called into question. Without a 
commitment from the EC to include agriculture, however, the Australian and U.S. 
delegations were unwilling to negotiate (Swinbank, 1996). The EC offered 
concessions by October 1987. The agreement on the new negotiation strategy was 
limited in scope and still preserved the fundamental mechanisms of the CAP 
(Swinbank, 1996). 
In April 1989 the EC agreed to substantial reductions in agricultural support but 
was unable to agree on an acceptable final offer for the GATT negotiations by the 
October 15, 1990 deadline, leading to collapse of the negotiations on December 6, 
1990. Five days later the EC commissioner for agriculture, Ray MacSharry, 
announced the Commission’s intention to propose revolutionary changes to the CAP, 
while still claiming that domestic agricultural reforms and the GATT talks were 
unrelated. Tanner and Swinbank (1996, 88) refute this claim, stating “It seems clear 
that the MacSharry reforms proposal had its origin in the internecine struggles of 
October 1990, as the EU sought to produce a GATT offer to meet international 
obligations.” 
The crux of MacSharry’s original proposal was to reduce farm prices. When the 
draft of MacSharry’s reforms was debated by the Agriculture Council, the discussion 
ended in deadlock. The EC arranged an acceptable compromise: reduced support 
prices for many major commodities were exchanged for increased direct payments to 
compensate farmers facing a loss of income. MacSharry’s reforms were significant 
and cut the cereal intervention price by 30 percent along with smaller cuts in beef and 
butter over a three-year time frame. These reductions were compensated for by 
payments per hectare of cereals and higher premium payments for dairy and beef. The 
reforms also enabled the Commission to reduce arable area, in order to control 
surpluses, through set-aside policies. 
In January 1991 the Commission formally submitted the final CAP reform 
document to the Council. In September 1991, the United States, the EC, Japan and 
Canada determined that the MacSharry proposals would enable continued GATT 
negotiations (Coleman and Tangermann, 1999). After Germany and France reluctantly 
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agreed, the MacSharry reforms were finally adopted in May 1992 and simultaneously 
spurred the Uruguay negotiations. MacSharry then went to Washington D.C. to forge 
an agreement in agriculture announced in November 1992 as the “Blair House 
accord.” MacSharry’s integral role in both domestic and international EU policy 
ensured that the CAP reform was compatible with the accord. The conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round on December 15, 1993 in Geneva mandated no further adjustment to 
the CAP. 
In 2003 the EU again undertook significant reform of the CAP. Swinbank and 
Daugbjerg (2006) evaluate numerous forces behind the reform, including 
enlargement, the balance of expenditures between rural development and price and 
income support, budgetary pressures and the WTO negotiations. They conclude that 
the WTO negotiations were a driving force. In further work Daugbjerg and Swinbank 
(2007) argue that CAP reform takes place within the context of WTO negotiations so 
that farm ministers can avoid blame for the decision, as when CAP reform is part of a 
broader package, the decision is passed to the European Council. The bottom line is 
that current EU processes have produced a cohesive policy that has enhanced the EU’s 
ability to negotiate. Blustein (2009, 137) supports this argument, noting that Lamy, 
then the EU commissioner for trade, came to Montreal with a hand strengthened by 
major reform of the CAP, claiming “We have done our homework and now it’s up to 
others to do theirs.” 
For our purpose of evaluating the institutional arrangements that produce 
connection between the CAP and the WTO, it doesn’t ultimately matter if domestic or 
international pressures played the larger role in CAP reform, as long as these pressures 
were melded into one cohesive vision for policy. A key point is that in the EU 
coherence is partially due to the pivotal role played by the Commission in both CAP 
reform and trade negotiations. The policy process ensures that all players have 
significant input into proposals for both trade negotiations and agricultural policy. The 
fact that decision making for both agricultural policy and trade were delegated from 
the national to the supranational level in the 1950s and 1960s has been a major factor 
in creating a policy process that does not respond to the same immediate pressures and 
political markets as the U.S Congress. As a result, the EU has been better able to 
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Conclusions 
The EU has had a cohesive domestic agricultural policy and trade policy due to 
the policy processes developed to delegate decision making to the supranational level 
and the key role of the Commission and Council in both. This may change with the 
increased role of the European Parliament due to the Lisbon Treaty. In contrast, the 
U.S. Congress delegated authority for trade negotiations and implementation over 
time to the USTR, while keeping the historical role of Congress for agricultural 
policy. Authority was delegated to the USTR when trade policy was largely concerned 
with manufactured goods. Critically, the United States has never had a systematic and 
widespread system of subsidizing manufacturing equivalent to the farm bill for 
agriculture and so no experience in coordinating these aspects of policy. It is likely 
Congress would not have supported inclusion of agriculture in WTO negotiations if a 
formal change, namely a reduction, in their authority and power to enact domestic 
farm legislation had been required. 
The dysfunction that has resulted for the United States has not been costly 
enough, particularly to Congress, for the country to contemplate changes to address 
the lack of coordination. The brunt of the costs are arguably felt by the USTR, whose 
ability to make credible commitments in trade negotiations is diminished, along with 
its ability to fulfill its organizational mission for trade liberalization. Marginal changes 
have been made to increase coordination and consultation between Congress and the 
USTR on agricultural policy without making any changes in Congressional power 
over agricultural policy. 
The Kennedy Round required four years to negotiate, the Tokyo Round seven 
years, the Uruguay Round nine years, and negotiations under the Doha Round have 
already surpassed ten years. As significant changes in agricultural policy are phased in 
gradually, implementation has occurred over five years for developed countries. 
Effective trade negotiations require a vision for domestic agricultural policy and the 
ability to make credible commitments at home and abroad. This is a big task for 
policymaking and one that the U.S. Congress is poorly structured to achieve. 
Constructs from transaction cost politics are useful in understanding the problem but 
do not provide a normative solution. If anything, TCP stresses the difficulty of making 
significant institutional change due to the reluctance of those with power to part with 
it. 
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